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On March 25, 2010, the Renewable Fuels Reinvestment 
Act (RFRA) was introduced in the U.S. Congress. The 
bill (HR 4940) would extend the $0.45 per gallon blend-
ers’  credit—the  Volumetric  Ethanol  Excise  Tax  Credit 
(VEETC)—as well as the $0.54 per gallon secondary tariff 
on imported ethanol until Dec. 31, 2015 (U.S. Congress, 
2010). There is a debate about the necessity of continuing 
these measures. Together with the Renewable Fuel Stan-
dard (RFS) under the 2007 Energy Independence and 
Security Act (EISA), subsidies and tariff protection have 
supported the development of the U.S. ethanol industry. 
In this article we examine inconsistencies that are emerg-
ing in these policies. Without a change in approach, the 
objective of achieving a major increase in the use of renew-
able fuels in the United States is unlikely to be realized.
According to recent news reports, the ethanol indus-
try is nearing the so-called blend wall—the maximum 
amount of the fuel that can be blended with gasoline at the 
current 10% blending limit (Wisner, 2010). Car manufac-
turers’ warranties and extended warranties for non-flex-
fuel vehicles—those specifically designed to use variable 
blends of gasoline and ethanol—cover only those using 
gasoline with a maximum ethanol share of 10% (E10) 
because higher blends may damage the engine and other 
components. If the U.S. Environmental Protection Agen-
cy (EPA) does not increase the permitted ethanol blending 
rate beyond the current level the domestic market poten-
tial for ethanol tops off at approximately 12.5-13.5 billion 
gallons (RFA, 2010b). The ethanol industry is asking the 
EPA to increase the blend ratio to 15%, but automakers 
and oil companies are resisting the change because of the 
risk of engine damage. The use of up to 12% ethanol could 
be an intermediate step (RFA, 2010a). Given the current 
fuel delivery infrastructure and limited prevalence of flex 
fuel vehicles, the demand for higher ethanol blends is ex-
pected to remain small for the foreseeable future (Taheri-
pour and Tyner, 2008). 
As we approach the blend wall, U.S. ethanol producers 
have begun to look overseas for markets. In the first quar-
ter of 2010, 83.5 million gallons of ethanol for non-bev-
erage use was exported, roughly a five-fold increase over 
the first quarter of 2009. Ethanol exports in the first three 
months of 2010 equaled 71% of the total exported in 2009 
and at the current rate more than 330 million gallons 
of ethanol—roughly 3% of expected total U.S. ethanol 
production of about 12 billion gallons—are expected to 
be exported in 2010 (RFA, 2010b; USDA, 2010). Major 
drivers of the export surge are tighter sugar-based supplies 
of ethanol from Brazil—the world’s other major produc-
er—due to high sugar prices and added Brazilian demand 
resulting from the removal of import tariffs on ethanol. 
Although U.S. exports are still small, they could expand 
if the world sugar price remains high and the demand for 
ethanol in the European Union, Brazil, and other regions 
increases. In Germany, for example, the amount of etha-
nol allowed in gasoline blends will be increased from 5 to 
10% by the end of 2010. However, many analysts expect 
world sugar prices to fall sharply as supply returns to more 
normal levels and this will exert downward pressure on 
world ethanol prices.
Although U.S. corn-ethanol producers are currently 
finding it profitable to export, what will happen if world 
prices fall? To examine this, we need to determine what 
will happen if domestic demand for ethanol continues to 
be limited due to the blend wall, at the same time as the 
mandated use of renewable fuels increases under EISA and 
the tax credit and tariff are continued under H.R. 4940. It 
is important to understand the implications of these poli-
cies for the future evolution of the market for ethanol.2  POLICY ISSUES    PI10 - August 2010 
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The key components of current U.S. 
ethanol policy are tax credits, tariffs, 
and  mandates.  Both  Federal  and 
state tax credits have contributed to 
the development of the industry. The 
current Federal credit is 45 cents per 
gallon. The tax credit is claimed by 
blenders,  rather  than  producers  of 
ethanol, and they only collect it by 
producing gasoline-ethanol blended 
fuel.
Tariffs on imported ethanol are 
composed of a 2.5% ad valorem tar-
iff and a 54 cents per gallon specific 
tariff, amounting to a combined to-
tal of roughly 60 cents per gallon (or 
an ad valorem equivalent of roughly 
25%), except for imports under the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative. Since the 
tax credit is potentially applicable to 
foreign ethanol used in blended fuel, 
the  tariff  exists  to  offset  the  credit 
that U.S. blenders would otherwise 
receive for imported ethanol and to 
encourage  the  use  of  the  domestic 
product.
The  Renewable  Fuel  Standard 
(RFS) was created by the Energy Pol-
icy Act of 2005 and amended by the 
Energy  Independence  and  Security 
Act of 2007. It requires that trans-
portation  fuel  sold  or  introduced 
into commerce in the United States 
contain minimum specified volumes 
of renewable fuel, advanced biofuel, 
cellulosic biofuel, and biomass-based 
diesel (EISA. H.R.6 Title XV, Sub-
title A, Sec. 202). Although the RFS 
specifies  the  minimum  amount  of 
renewable fuel to be used, it is likely 
to  be  enforced  through  a  blending 
requirement using RINs (Renewable 
Identification  Numbers).  The  EISA 
of 2007, SEC. 202., specifies that the 
mandate  will  “…ensure  that  trans-
portation fuel sold or introduced into 
commerce in the United States—ex-
cept in noncontiguous States or ter-
ritories—on an annual average basis, 
contains at least the applicable vol-
ume of renewable fuel…”. The appli-
cable volume is 12.95 billion gallons 
in 2010 and rises steadily to 36 bil-
lion gallons by 2022. According to 
the Federal Trade Commission Act 
of  1914,  SEC.  44.,  “commerce”  in 
the United States is defined as that 
“among the several States or with for-
eign  nations…”.  The  implication  is 
that while the amount of renewable 
fuel that has to be used by blenders is 
mandated, the blended fuel that they 
produce  does  not  have  to  be  con-
sumed in the United States. This will 
prove to be significant if the blend 
wall continues to constrain U.S. con-
sumption of blended fuel.
The Tax Credit and the Blend Wall
If the minimum volume of ethanol 
required  to  satisfy  the  RFS  is  less 
than the maximum amount that can 
be  consumed  domestically,  ethanol 
use will increase until its price is close 
to that of gasoline because the two 
fuels are similar products, although 
there is still likely to be a price differ-
ential because ethanol has only two-
thirds the energy content of gasoline. 
The tax credit encourages an expand-
ed supply of ethanol and increased 
usage  beyond  the  RFS  minimum 
requirement (Babcock, 2010). Once 
the blend wall is reached, providing 
there is no foreign ethanol demand, 
there will be downward pressure on 
the consumer ethanol price and the 
price of mixed fuel. The tax credit 
generates little or no additional con-
sumer demand for ethanol and will 
simply encourage Americans to con-
sume  more  fossil  fuel  because  the 
overall  price  of  fuel  will  be  lower. 
Ethanol and corn producers do not 
obtain  any  additional  benefit  from 
the tax credit, since demand is con-
strained. So, if world ethanol prices 
are low or exports are prevented by 
trade  policies  in  other  countries, 
the  tax  credit  would  have  perverse 
consequences—that  is,  lower  fuel 
prices and increased consumption of 
fossil fuel.
If corn-based ethanol is competi-
tive in the world market due to a fa-
vorable world price, the United States 
would  likely  export  ethanol.  Even 
if the blend wall did not exist, the 
United States could export when the 
world price is higher than the domes-
tic price, taking into account trans-
portation costs and trade policies in 
foreign countries, although domestic 
use is likely to be more attractive be-
cause of the tax credit. But with the 
blend wall, more U.S. ethanol would 
become available for export because 
the domestic price would drop in the 
absence of trade. A serious issue in 
this context is that ethanol refineries 
and blenders would have an incentive 
to produce blended fuel for export in 
order to use up additional supplies of 
ethanol and to collect the tax credit. 
In  that  case,  the  tax  credit  would 
act as an export subsidy for blended 
fuel. This has already happened with 
U.S. biodiesel. The biodiesel industry 
used the blenders’ credit to subsidize 
exports of up to 80% of its produc-
tion—which was based on imported 
biodiesel from Asia and South Amer-
ica—to Europe until the European 
Commission  imposed  antidumping 
and countervailing duties in March 
2009. With the blend wall in place, 
the  U.S.  ethanol  industry  might 
choose to follow the earlier example 
of  the  biodiesel  industry  and  this 
could stimulate a similar response in 
the form of antidumping or counter-
vailing duties in potential importers.
The RFS and the Blend Wall
Enforcement of higher levels of etha-
nol use through the RFS in the pres-
ence of the blend wall will mean that 
the resulting excess supply of ethanol 
or blended fuel will have to be dis-
posed  of  on  international  markets. 
Without a tax credit, this would re-
sult in lower profits for blenders, but 
the tax credit helps to offset the costs 
of  moving  mandated  excess  pro-
duction  into  international  markets. 
Again, the result is either dumping 
or an implicit export subsidy as U.S. 
ethanol or mixed fuel is sold interna-
tionally at a discount. Naturally, the 
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to be revisited in light of the evolu-
tion of transportation fuel demand 
in the United States. If the mandated 
volume  exceeds  feasible  domestic 
consumption  because  of  the  blend 
wall,  the  RFS  will  be  problematic 
both nationally and internationally. 
It could have serious negative impacts 
on U.S. ethanol producers, blenders, 
and/or  world  ethanol  producers.  If 
the aim is to stimulate the significant 
replacement of liquid fossil fuels by 
renewable substitutes—and that ob-
jective remains open to debate— it 
would seem to be appropriate to re-
focus policy on the development of 
the infrastructure to deliver new fuel 
blends and on promoting the devel-
opment and adoption of the vehicles 
needed to use these blends. Existing 
policies contain some modest initia-
tives in these areas, but overall there 
appears to be a need for a major shift 
in policy orientation if this is to be 
achieved.  Another  policy  direction 
would be to promote the production 
of green hydrocarbons that are near 
perfect substitutes for fossil fuels—
gasoline,  diesel,  and  jet  fuel—and, 
thus,  can  be  used  in  the  existing 
fuel system seamlessly—no need for 
blending limits, flex fuel vehicles, or 
a  separate  distribution  infrastruc-
ture.  Half  of  the  biofuel  projects 
funded by the U.S. Department of 
Energy  (DOE)  in  December  2009 
using stimulus money are directed to 
the development of such biofuels.
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have  to  be  exported  to  satisfy  the 
mandate.  Applying  the  RFS  of  36 
billion gallons to current blend-wall 
estimates  of  around  13  billion  gal-
lons  clearly  indicates  a  significant 
surplus. Estimating what the actual 
surplus  might  be  in  the  future  is 
extremely  complicated  since  future 
domestic demand for ethanol will be 
influenced by a whole range of fac-
tors,  including  vehicle  technology 
(average miles per gallon, what blend 
ratios will be usable), how many ve-
hicles there will be and how many 
miles  their  owners  will  choose  to 
drive. The latter will be influenced by 
fuel prices and consumer incomes, as 
well as changing demographics. Fuel 
efficiency standards and how vehicle 
manufacturers choose to implement 
these will also have an impact on to-
tal fuel use and its composition. 
Future policy directions
Although the future demand for re-
newable fuels in the United States is 
difficult to predict, it seems clear that 
the renewal of the excise tax credit as 
proposed under HR 4940 would not 
be advisable if we wish both to con-
tain the costs of continuing to devel-
op the domestic biofuel market and 
to limit domestic and international 
market  distortions.  With  limited 
domestic demand due to the blend 
wall,  the  tax  credit  would  increase 
fossil fuel consumption by depressing 
fuel prices or act as an export subsidy. 
Whether or not the tariff should be 
maintained  is  open  to  debate.  If 
world prices of ethanol fall as a re-
sult of downward price adjustments 
in the world sugar market, continued 
tariff preference could be important 
for sustaining the domestic ethanol 
industry  in  the  absence  of  the  tax 
credit. Conversely if the objective is 
to replace fossil fuel use in the United 
States with renewable fuels, regard-
less of their source, tariff protection 
could be eliminated.
It  also  seems  clear  that  future 
quantities  of  renewable  fuel  use 
mandated under the RFS will have 
also be reduced, but given inelastic 
domestic demand it is unlikely that 
expanded  domestic  consumption 
would be sufficient to absorb all the 
additional  blended  fuel  that  would 
need  to  be  produced  to  satisfy  the 
RFS.  Discounted  exports  of  mixed 
fuel would also exert downward pres-
sure  on  international  oil  prices,  so 
there would be some stimulus to fuel 
consumption in the rest of the world. 
Exporters of ethanol, such as Brazil, 
that would otherwise be active in in-
ternational markets would probably 
find that demand for their product 
was reduced because of the availabil-
ity of competing low-priced ethanol 
or mixed fuel from the United States. 
The situation is complicated fur-
ther by the fact that if no new sup-
plies of alternative ‘advanced biofu-
els’ emerge, enforcement of the part 
of the RFS mandate that relates to 
that category would require imports 
of  foreign  sugarcane-based  ethanol 
regardless of the level of the world 
ethanol price, since sugar-based etha-
nol qualifies as an ‘advanced’ biofuel 
in the legislation. With a blend wall, 
importing  sugar-based  ethanol  to 
satisfy the advanced biofuel mandate 
does not make sense. It would sim-
ply  increase  the  amount  of  corn-
based ethanol that would need to be 
exported since total consumption of 
ethanol is constrained. Finally, lower 
ethanol and mixed fuel prices would 
reduce the incentive to develop sec-
ond  and  third  generation  fuels  de-
rived from woody biomass or algae 
commercially  except  for  those  that 
are not constrained by blending lim-
its, green hydrocarbons, for example. 
These  new  generation  biofuels  may 
have environmental advantages over 
agriculturally-based supplies of etha-
nol, and their production would like-
ly exert less pressure on food prices.
The  magnitude  of  the  effects 
on world energy markets from this 
distorted  mix  of  U.S.  policies  will 
depend on the degree to which the 
RFS exceeds the blend wall and con-
sequently  how  much  ethanol  will 4  POLICY ISSUES    PI10 - August 2010 
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